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used in Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) to examine firm-led rene-
gotiations. After extending the theoretical framework to a multiple-
period context in which both Pareto improving and rent shifting rene-
gotiations at the initiative of the government can occur, we develop an
original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract
endogeneity and derive empirical results. While some of the main in-
sights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when
awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes
are unchanged, significant differences arise with respect to the effect
of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. We
provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially im-
portant in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism.
1 Introduction
Contract renegotiation has long been an important topic in the theoretical
contracting literature.1 However, despite the obvious relevance of this issue
for practical contracting relationships, to date the empirical literature on the
subject is extremely scant. A few papers have looked at how the potential
cost of ex post renegotiations affects optimal contracting, be it the form of
the contracts themselves, their degree of incompleteness, the way contractors
are selected and their eventual bidding behavior.2 Recently, Gil (2005) looks
at the determinants of contract renegotiation in the Spanish movie business,
and the impact of those on the structure of the industry.
This paper analyzes the determinants of renegotiations at the initiative of
the government in infrastructure concession contracts, using a Latin Amer-
ican data set from the World Bank, covering 307 concession projects in the
sectors of transport and water, in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Mexico) between 1989 and 2000. Its empirical contribution is
important in several ways. First, it is based on a unique dataset from several
1See for example, among many others, Dewatripont (1986), Hart and Tirole (1988)
and Laffont and Tirole (1990) in the context of complete contracts, and Hart and Moore
(1988), Green and Laffont (1992), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Segal and
Whinston (2002) when initial contracts are assumed to be incomplete.
2See Crocker and Reynolds (1993) on air force engine procurement, Bajari, McMillan
and Tadelis (2003) on private sector building contracts, Chakravarty and MacLeod (2004)
on form construction contracts, and Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2006) on highway
paving contracts.
2
Latin American countries that includes both detailed contract characteris-
tics as well as more generic country institutional aspects and macroeconomic
data, allowing to disentangle the role of contractual design, economic shocks
and institutional quality in determining the performance of contracts.
Second, it analyzes the performance of infrastructure contracts in sectors
that have a major impact on both social and economic development of the
host countries. Therefore, to the extent that the results signal potential
improvements in the form of contractual relationships, the policy implications
may be crucial from a welfare point of view. Third, it is to our knowledge,
the first study to look separately at renegotiation depending on which party
initiates it.
There are additional good reasons that make Latin American data par-
ticularly appropriate for an empirical investigation on the determinants of
concession contract renegotiation. Because the region was the pioneer in
awarding concessions, by 2000 many countries had an established track record
with this form of private sector involvement, allowing the construction of a
suitable panel.3 Moreover, as mentioned above, the region has witnessed an
unexpectedly high incidence of renegotiation. All this makes Latin America
a perfect laboratory for this kind of study.
The present paper complements a previous study based on the same
dataset that focused on the analysis of firm-led renegotiation (Guasch, Laf-
font and Straub, 2003, referred to hereinafter as GLS). There, we showed
that more than half of these projects were renegotiated (162 out of 307)
and very fast, on average 3.5 year after the signing of the contract. The
paper built a model of renegotiation that included contract characteristics,
regulatory and institutional environment, as well as external shocks, and con-
ducted an empirical analysis that confirmed most of the predictions of the
model and yielded interesting policy implications, especially with respect to
the importance of having a regulatory body in place at the time of awarding
a concession and of choosing the appropriate regulatory regime. We showed
that price caps, which have been the dominant choice of policy makers in
Latin America, suffer from a great fragility to shocks and trigger significant
renegotiation.4
3See Harris (2003) and Guasch (2004).
4As a consequence, there is currently a growing pragmatic tendency to advocate the
abandonment of price cap regulation, a synonym for the higher risk of renegotiation and
higher cost of capital, and the return to an hybrid type of regulation, including some
elements of rate of return. See for example Estache, Guasch and Trujillo (2003).
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Empirically, a number of differences with firm-led renegotiations are to be
expected. One open question is the influence of price cap regulation. Firms’
calls for renegotiation were the intuitive outcome when the cap appeared
to be too restrictive. Here, we could expect a reverse effect, in the sense
that governments would like to renegotiate caps that proved too generous
and leave excessive profits to the firms (the opportunistic calls). However, it
could also be the case that governments concerned about the continuity of
service or the realization of planned investments would step in when firms
are making losses, resulting in a similar effect of price cap on firm-led and
government-led renegotiations. Another aspect of interest is the behavior of
variables affecting the status quo of the parties in a renegotiation, in partic-
ular the financing variables, which effect should be the opposite as with firm-
led renegotiation. Finally, it is not clear how institutional quality variables
should behave, as a number of channels involving the quality of the bureau-
cracy and the possibility of capture can be envisioned. Indeed, corruption
can be expected to give rise to hidden and non-transparent renegotiations,5
or on the contrary to produce ex ante biased awards through direct adju-
dication or the manipulation of insider information, resulting in a situation
in which concessionaire and government representatives share excessive rents
and have little incentive to renegotiate.
From an econometric viewpoint, our analysis must address a number of
issues.6 The starting point is the recognition of the potential endogeneity of
most contract clauses. Indeed, we expect that a self-selection effect may af-
fect the final characteristics of the projects to be undertaken and the clauses
of the contracts according to governments’ and concessionaires’ specific char-
acteristics, some of which will obviously not be observed. In other words, self-
selection is most likely to arise because of the potential correlation between
contractual and environmental explanatory variables and the error term as
a consequence of omitted variables, in particular the above-mentioned unob-
served characteristics of the parties and the projects. More specifically, these
unobserved factors will likely be of two types: country-specific (political and
institutional) and operator-specific.
We develop a set of two instruments that summarize, for each contrac-
tual dimension (e.g. price regulation, financing structure, guarantees) and
5E.g. the Mexican Northeast Railway concession or the generic case of highway fran-
chising in Latin America, discussed in Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2003).
6See Chiappori and Salanie (2003) for an overview of issues in the empirical contract
literature.
4
for each observation (each project in a given country and sector), the aver-
age prevalence, at the time the contract is signed, of the same contractual
dimension for projects in the same sector in different countries, and in dif-
ferent sectors in different countries respectively.
To the extent that the correlation between the choice of price regulation
for example, and unobserved variables boils down to country- and operator-
specific effects, the choice of price cap regulation will only be correlated
across different countries (and different sectors) through some additional as-
pects that are independent of these specific effects, for example worldwide
technology or policy trends, common across countries.
The second issue is related to the binary nature of our endogenous re-
gressors. In binary outcomes model, a two-stage instrumental estimation is
known to yield biased estimates, a problem that can be avoided performing
maximum likelihood estimations. However, this proves intractable given the
panel nature of our data and the fact that we deal with several endogenous
variables simultaneously. Instead, we follow Angrist (1991), who argues that
in a simple two-stage strategy the bias is likely to be negligible, and states
moreover that this approach is acceptable as long as the focus is on causal
effects rather than on the determination of structural parameters (Angrist,
2002). Finally, as robustness check, we estimate a linear probability model
by two stage least squares and show that the results are preserved.
The results on both the importance of having a regulator and the fragility
of price caps are unchanged with respect to firm-led renegotiation. On the
other hand, consistently with the theoretical predictions, investment and
financing variables have reversed effects, as does corruption. Moreover, we
present additional evidence showing that the role of an experienced and inde-
pendent regulator is especially important in contexts characterized by weak
governance and high likelihood of political expropriation. This is certainly
an important result, as it shows that strong and experienced regulators are
likely to act as barriers against political opportunism, especially when they
are present at early stages of concessions’ lives.
Section 2 below presents the evidence concerning infrastructure conces-
sions and government-led renegotiations in Latin America. Section 3 dis-
cusses the theoretical challenge posed by this type of renegotiation and spells
out the model. Section 4 presents the data, explains the methodology in de-
tails and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Government-led Renegotiations: An
Overview
The 1990s witnessed a spectacular wave of private sector participation in
infrastructure. Considering the four infrastructure sectors, transport, wa-
ter, energy and telecommunications, US$754 billion was invested between
1990 and 2001 in around 2,500 projects with private sector participation
in developing countries.7 Of this, 48% was directed to Latin America and
the Caribbean, where these investments were in their majority related to
the sale or concessioning of existing assets. Due to political and sometimes
constitutional and legal reasons making outright privatization difficult, con-
cessions have been the salient choice for private sector participation. They
have accounted for 67% of all projects worldwide, being moreover the almost
exclusive form of private sector involvement in water and transport, as well
as some energy projects. A concession provides its holder the right to operate
a service for a limited period of time (usually 20 to 30 years), at the end of
which all the assets revert back to the government. The concessionaire is
responsible for any obligations specified in the contract in exchange for the
right to the cash-flow of the users’ payments.
However, by the early 2000s, a growing disenchantment with private sec-
tor involvement in general and concessions in particular has forced govern-
ments to slow down or stop the program and reform process in practically all
countries in Latin America. Annual flows of investment are well below their
1997 peak. There are clearly doubts that stem from the frequent conflicts
that arose in the past between contractual parties, with a large number of
projects having been renegotiated or taken over by governments. Quite of-
ten, governments have behaved opportunistically, taking ex post regulatory
actions to expropriate the available quasi-rents and “sunk” type investments.
Typical scenarios are a government or a mayor in the case of water con-
cessions (mayors have exclusive jurisdiction on water operations) deciding in
a unilateral fashion to cut tariffs or not to honor agreed tariff increases during
a re-election campaign to secure popular support, or a new administration
deciding not to honor the tariffs increase stated in the concession contract
granted by the previous administrations.
Examples, to mention only a few, include recent popular unrest in Bolivia,
which led in January 2005 to the cancellation of the La Paz and El Alto water
7See Harris (2003).
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concession, led by the French multinational Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux. As of
2005, most of the concessions awarded in Argentina prior to the 2001 crisis
are still undergoing protracted renegotiation processes, despite the country’s
agreement to abide to international arbitration, under bilateral investment
treaties signed by the government of Carlos Menem in the 1990s.8 The
Limeira water concession in Brazil was denied tariffs adjustment supposed
to be automatic according to the contract. The local mayor argued that the
contract, signed by a previous administration, was unfair and compromised
the municipality’s long term interests. In 1995, a new local government
took office and sought to limit previously agreed upon tariff increases in the
Tucuman water and sanitation contract in Argentina. This finally led the
concessionaire to abandon the concession in 1996. In the toll road concession
in Pernambuco, Brazil, the regional government decided to cut the tariffs
unilaterally shortly before elections.
In most cases, the social costs of such renegotiations are likely to be
high. The knowledge by potential investors that the temptation exists to
expropriate investments ex post may discourage investment in the first place
or it might require an additional risk premium in the form of bigger tariffs or
smaller transfer price to compensate for the increased cost of capital.9 Other
potential costs include large scale service disruption, failure to meet coverage
expansion targets and cost pass-through to users or taxpayers in excess of
initial agreements. An extreme example is the Mexican toll road program,
comprising 52 highways built under private concessions in the early 1990s,
which was finally bailed out by the government in 1997 at an estimated cost
of between US$7 to 12 billion (1 to 1.7% of GDP).10
3 Theory: Government-led Renegotiations
From a theoretical point of view, government-led renegotiations represent a
different challenge than firm-led ones.11 Indeed, if firms have private informa-
8See The Economist, March 17, 2005.
9In the water concession in the city of Buenos Aires, the regulator granted a tariff
increase of 3.5% for each percentage point increase on the cost of capital (Guasch and
Spiller, 1999).
10See Guasch (2004) for a detailed description of the Latin American experience with
concessions and discussion on these and other cases.
11A longer version of the model summarized here, including detailed discussions of the
assumptions, can be found in Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2005.
7
tion and anticipate opportunistic behavior by the government, for example
because it is not able to commit not to renegotiate, they may want to hide
their information to protect future rent. The resulting ratchet effect may
give rise to extremely complex situations.12
While it is not our objective to develop and test a structural model, we
intend to give some theoretical foundations to our empirical tests by extend-
ing the GLS framework to two or more periods, thus explicitly incorporating
political cycle considerations in the analysis.
In GLS, we consider an ex ante regulatory contract between the govern-
ment and a firm, under asymmetric information on the firm’s cost, which
the firm accepts or not before discovering its type.13 Therefore, because the
participation constraint is only satisfied in expectation at the signing of the
deal, ex post a high-cost firm is left with a negative utility and would like
to renegotiate the contract.14 The government invests in a costly mechanism
that ensures the enforcement of the contract with some probability π(x),
depending on the endogenous level of expenses x incurred. The model is
then enriched to include a number of characteristics of concession contracts,
as well as the regulatory environment, exogenous economic shocks and the
quality of institutions.
The probability of renegotiation is then given by the expression:
Pr(renegotiation) = (1− ν − ε) (1− θπ(x)) , (1)
where 1−ν is the ex ante probability that the firm is of the high-cost type, ε
is a shortcut to model an exogenous shock on demand or on the firms’ costs
(through a devaluation or some similar macroeconomic shock), and θ is a
shift parameter capturing the level of quality of institutions, with θ closer
to 1 corresponding to better institutions (more efficient bureaucracy, less
corruption).
The following Figure 1. summarizes the structure and outcome of this
model.
12See for example Laffont and Tirole, 1993.
13Several extensions are presented in Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2006.
14See Laffont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2. Note that this extends to the case in
which the firm is protected by limited liability, for example because it must be able to
repay the amount privately borrowed to finance the investment. Then, a high-cost firm
still intends to renegotiate if the expected utility from doing so exceeds its utility under
the initial contract.
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Figure 1: GLS theoretical framework
3.1 Political Cycle
To account for the possibility that at some point during the life of the project,
the regulatory body may propose to the firm a renegotiation of the initial
contract, we now explicitly introduce political cycle considerations.
Consider that the contract described above is signed for two periods.15
At the beginning of the second period (time t = 2), elections take place and
the incumbent government is reelected with exogenous probability q. With
probability 1 − q, a new government is elected and then remains in power
throughout the second period.16
Moreover, we assume that the initial government has the ability to engage
in long term contracting that goes beyond its own term in power. We also
assume it can commit itself to its policy (commit not to renegotiate), so
15As will become clear, this could be extended to 3 or more periods without changes.
Note that in our sample more than 97% of the contracts are signed for between 20 and 30
years.
16The reason to consider the probability of a political change as exogenous is that
regulatory issues are unlikely to be pivotal in shaping the outcome of elections. This
assumption is introduced for example by Besley and Coate (2003) in the context of US
data.
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that if it remains in power, no government-led renegotiation offer is made.
However, when a change of majority occurs, the new government has the
ability to renegotiate, with the initial contract representing the status quo
utility level of the firm. Thus, the firm may refuse the new contract it is
offered and carry on with the initial one.17
Additionally, we assume that with a small probability µ, the newly elected
government does not respect its legal obligations and it reneges on the out-
standing contract, in effect expropriating the firm’s rent. In this context,
it is intuitive to think about the probability of expropriation as a shortcut
to the country’s level of political risk, which is known in expectation by the
investing firm and guides its decision to apply for the concession ex ante. It
therefore makes sense to keep it exogenous, as it is likely to depend on factors
lying outside the scope of a given concession.18
3.2 Pareto Improving Renegotiation
In second period, a newly elected government (probability 1−q) makes a take-
it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer to the firm. If the firm accepts the offer, the
contract is modified accordingly. If it rejects it, the original contract remains
unaltered.
Given the possibility of political change, the initial government does not
alter the contract it offers to the firm at time t = 1, which is still characterized
by the following menu:
C =
n³
qL; eL;U
1
= 0
´
;
¡
qE = q∗; eE = e∗;U1 = Φ
¡
eL
¢¢o
. (2)
This follows straightforwardly from the fact that this government is not able
to renegotiate the contract if it stays in power in the second period, nor is it
able to shift the allocation of the rent across time.19
17See Aubert and Laffont (2002) for a justification of this assumption.
18While political risk assessment is widely used by firms investing in developing coun-
tries, some extreme and unforeseeable cases of commitment breakdown seem to be driven
more by governments’ inability to manage shocks, as the following quote from Harris
(2003) suggests: “For their part, some investors over-estimated the ability of governments
to manage the reform process and hence honor their tariff, and other, commitments. In
some cases, such as in Indonesia and Argentina, this extended to judgments about the
ability of the government to sustain stable macroeconomic policies.”
19This would only matter if the government were composed of stake-holders of the firm,
so it would retain some benefit from the firm’s rent even after leaving power. In this case,
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The key issue here is to determine whether the fact that a new government
offers to renegotiate the original contract with probability 1− q will induce
any strategic behavior from the firm in the first place. In other word, we
need to determine whether they will be any ratchet effect.
This question boils down to the problem of whether the good type will
have an interest in mimicing the bad type at t = 1 in order to secure a
better deal at t = 2. Indeed, given the original contract, at t = 2 the new
government will only offer renegotiation to the bad type, proposing to raise
the level of production (qL) to the first best level q∗, while maintaining its
rent to the previous level (U
1
= 0). There is no room for renegotiation with
the good type, as it is already producing the first best level q∗ and would
reject any proposal reducing its rent.
The analysis in the present case is greatly simplified by observing that the
original contract is signed before the firm actually learns its type. Moreover,
just after the initial agreement, the bad type firm actually intends to rene-
gotiate its contract. Thus, the only way for a good firm to mimic a bad one
would be to ask for a renegotiation at t = 1. We have assumed that in the
original model without political change, the good firm is worse off if mimic-
ing the bad firm and renegotiating. We refer the reader to Guasch, Laffont
and Straub (2005) for the derivation of the modified condition, which is the
equivalent (in a two period framework) of the condition spelled out for the
general model in footnote 13 of GLS, and which we again assume is satisfied.
Therefore, Pareto improving renegotiation only occurs for the bad type
firm, with the result that the production level is raised to the first-best level
and the rent stays at its previous level of zero.
3.3 Rent Shifting Renegotiation
Consider now that with probability µ, the newly elected government does
not stand by its obligation to respect the status quo utility of the firm and
expropriates its rent, as in the introductory example of an incoming adminis-
tration deciding not to honor tariff adjustment committed by its predecessor.
Two additional instances of renegotiation now occur. First, with probability
(1− q)µ, the government reneges on the good firm’s contract and offers a
new contract
¡
q∗; e∗; 0
¢
. Second, when a firm-led renegotiation has succeeded
it may want to distort the original contract to modify the posterior renegotiation game
between the firm and its successor (Aubert and Laffont, 2002).
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in period 1, the bad firm enjoys a contract giving it a rent U
E
. Again, with
probability (1− q)µ, the government calls for a renegotiation and makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer involving a contract (q∗; e∗; 0).
It is easy to see that the separating condition spelled above is not modified
substantially. indeed, the left hand side changes as the utility that accrues
to a good firm choosing the good contract at t = 1 is now brought down to
0 with probability (1− q)µ at t = 2. If µ is small enough, this inequality is
still verified.20
3.4 Probability of Government-led Renegotiations
Considering that the good type will not want to cheat, we show in Figure 2
below the tree of actions and the eventual occurrence of renegotiation.
No change for 
good firm. New 
contract is offered, 
raising production 
level to the first 
best level for a bad 
type firm only:
q
1-q
( )0,, 1** =Ueq
No renegotiation offer. Initial 
contract remain valid.
1-µ
µ
Expropriation, with 
contract raised to first-best 
production level and U=0.
t=2. Elections 
take place
Change of 
government
Government 
stays in power
Figure 2
Conditional on a political change, the probability of renegotiation at the
initiative of the government is given by the sum of the probabilities to have
a Pareto improving renegotiation (contract with a bad type firm that was
20See Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2005).
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successfully enforced (1− ν − ε) θπ
¡
xL
¢
(1− q)) and a rent-shifting renegoti-
ation: contract with a good firm, probability (ν (1− q)µ), as well as renegoti-
ated contract with a bad type firm ((1− ν − ε)
¡
1− θπ
¡
xL
¢¢
(1− P ) (1− q)µ).
This yields:
Pr (Govt-led renegotiation) =
(1− q) [µ− (1− ν − ε)Pµ+ (1− ν − ε) (1− (1− P )µ) θπ (x)] . (3)
3.5 Link with Empirical Analysis
Before introducing the empirical work, it is useful to summarize the lessons
of the theoretical model and to make clear how they inform the data analysis.
Table 1: Predictions of the model and empirical proxies  
Variables of the 
theoretical model 
 
Variables of the empirical model 
 
Expected effect 
Comparison 
with firm-led 
renegotiation 
Probability of 
renegotiation 
Renegotiation initiated by the government: Dummy variable indicating 
whether there was or not a renegotiation of the concession contract at the 
initiative of the government. 
 
left-hand variable 
 
The pre-contract 
asymmetry of 
information 
determines the power 
of incentives 
Price cap: Dummy variable taken as a proxy for the power of incentives.  
ambiguous 
 
same 
 
Sunk cost F 
Investment requirements: Dummy variable indicating whether there are or 
not investment requirements as part of the concession contract, investment 
being considered to be mainly sunk. 
 
ambiguous 
 
 
reversed 
Private financing K Private financing: Dummy variable indicating whether the project is 
funded entirely through private funds, excluding any public investment. 
ambiguous  reversed 
Shocks ε  Growth / Exchange rate shocks: internal or external macroeconomic shocks 
that impact either cost or demand of the firms. 
- same 
Institutional quality θ  Indices of corruption / rule of law / bureaucratic quality: standard 
perception indices taken as proxies of institutional quality 
+ 
 
reversed 
 
Elections/political 
changes 1-q 
Elections: Changes of the political majority are considered to trigger offer 
to renegotiate from the new government. 
Existence of regulator: Dummy variable indicating whether there was a 
regulator or no at the time the contract was signed. The existence of a 
regulator might correspond to a lower ability to renegotiate by new 
government. 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
same 
 
same 
 
Given the expression for π (x), and the comparative statics already dis-
cussed in GLS, it is possible to derive from the model a set of predictions for
the sign of the effects of different variables on the probability of government-
led renegotiation. One key implication is that any variable of the model
affecting the enforcement probability π (x), either directly, like institutional
variables (θ), or indirectly, like the financing aspects (K and F ) that define
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the statu quo of the parties, will have opposite effect on the probability of
government-led versus firm-led renegotiation. On the other hand, the effects
of price regulation, elections, shocks or of the existence of a regulator, ap-
pear to be unchanged. Assessing the relevance of this prediction will be one
objective of the empirical analysis.
However, as explained in the introduction, the empirical analysis intends
to go beyond the model developed above and it will more generally aim at
testing the effect of a number of contractual and environmental variables
on the likelihood of government-led renegotiation calls, with a special focus
on political variables and aspects related to the quality and efficiency of
government institutions. Table 1 summarizes the predictions for a number
of variables included in the model.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The Data
We use an original data set, developed by the World Bank, which describes
the characteristics of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin American and
Caribbean countries from 1982 to 2000.21 As in GLS, and to keep results
strictly comparable, we again focus on water and transport concessions in
five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), between 1989
and 2000. We have information on the general details of the projects (sector,
activity, year of award, award criteria, size and duration of the concession), on
the institutional and regulatory context, the type of regulatory framework
put in place (price cap or rate of return), as well as the evolution of the
main economic variables (growth, exchange rate, inflation) and the timing of
national and local elections. Tables A1 in the Appendix presents the full list
and definitions of variables used in the analysis below and gives summary
statistics, while Table A2 shows the distribution by types (e.g. price cap
vs. rate of return regulation, minimum income guarantee vs. no guarantee,
etc.) of the renegotiated and non-renegotiated concessions, looking first at
all renegotiations and then only at government-led renegotiations.
Looking at the incidence of the different types of renegotiations (led
by firms, the government or both), 162 out of 307 projects were renego-
tiated, with 53 firms’ calls, 15 joint calls and 94 governments’ call. These
21See GLS (2003) and Guasch (2004) for additional details on the data set.
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government-led renegotiations appear to be concentrated in Brazil (36), Mex-
ico (57) and Colombia (1). The Brazilian wave of renegotiation occurred
between 1997 and 2000, with a peak in 1999 (24). In Mexico, it was between
1993 and 1998, with more than 10 renegotiations in each year from 1993 to
1996, and a peak of 19 in 1995 (see Table 2).
Table 2: Government-led renegotiations by country, year and sector 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Brazil     0/1 0/5 15/9 0/6 15/21 
Colombia       1/0  1/0 
Mexico 5/5 8/5 3/16 1/10 2/0 0/2   19/38 
(Renegotiations in the transport sector/ Renegotiations in the water sector) 
This observed concentration in 2 countries and within well-defined time
periods raises the potential caveat that political and institutional variables
may exhibit little variance in actual renegotiation cases. However, we expect
the significance of these variables to stem from the variance between coun-
tries and time periods with and without renegotiations. Why did electoral
dates generate renegotiations in Mexico and Brazil and not in Chile or in
Argentina? What conjunction of contractual clauses, economic and political
events prevented political changes in Brazil before 1999 to end up in a wave
of government-led renegotiation calls? We still expect political variables in
our sample to provide an important part of the answer.
As for the sector allocation, renegotiated transport projects are exclu-
sively road projects (15 in Brazil, 1 in Colombia and 19 in Mexico). Renego-
tiated water projects are more evenly distributed: Of the 21 Brazilian cases,
3 were in potable water, 7 in sewer, and 11 in composite projects, while of the
38 Mexican cases, 6 were in potable water, 29 in sewer, and 3 in composite
projects.
4.2 Timing of Renegotiations
To contrast the relevance of our theoretical approach, we start by analyz-
ing the timing of the different types of renegotiation, in particular with
respect to election deadlines. Figure 3 shows the number of government-
and concessionaire-led renegotiations, disaggregating them by looking at
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how many elections took place during the life of the project. As is ap-
parent, government-led renegotiations tend to be strongly concentrated after
the first election (79% of the total), while concessionaire-led ones are more
evenly distributed and take place almost with equal frequency after 0, 1, or
2 elections.22
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We confirm these stylized facts in the probit analysis. Indeed, results not
shown here indicate that a lagged dummy for the first election is positive
and significant at the 5% level on the probability of government-led renegoti-
ation, with a marginal effect slightly above 10%, while it is negative and not
significant for firm-led renegotiation. Overall, this gives a picture consistent
with our model assumption, namely that concessionaire-led renegotiations
tend to occur mainly for contractual reasons or in response to adverse unex-
pected shocks, while government-led renegotiations are generally politically
motivated and are likely to follow elections.
22Note that a representation of sample hazard rates, showing these figures as percentages
of outstanding concessions, gives similar results.
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4.3 Methodology
We perform random probit estimations, using as dependent variable the
dummy indicating, for each project i in country n, whether there is a rene-
gotiation initiated by the government at time t, where t varies between 1989
and 2000.23 The probit model is given by:
yint = 1 [y
∗
int = xiα1 + α3zint +Entα3 + eint < 0] , (4)
where 1[.] is the indicator function taking value 1 whenever the statement
in brackets is true, and 0 otherwise; yint is the binary variable indicating
whether concession i, in country n, at time t, was renegotiated or not at the
initiative of the government; xi is a vector of time invariant characteristics
of the concession contracts; zint is the number of years, since the award of
concession i, in country n; Ent is a vector of environmental characteristics
(macroeconomic indicators, elections and institutional indices); eint is the
error term; and α1, α2, and α3 are the vectors of parameters corresponding
to xi, zint and Ent respectively.
4.4 Endogeneity
As already discussed in GLS, the use of contractual aspects as explanatory
variables raises the question of their potential endogeneity. Indeed, we expect
a self-selection effect, with governments and concessionaires altering the final
characteristics of the projects to be undertaken and the clauses of the con-
tracts according to the projects’ as well as their own characteristics, which
may sometimes be unobserved.
The first issue in a such a context, is the choice of suitable instruments.
We start by observing that in an estimation of the probability of renego-
tiation using environmental and contractual explanatory variables, the po-
tential source of self-selection-related endogeneity of the latter lies in the
potential correlation between them and the error term as a consequence of
omitted variables, in particular unobserved characteristics of the parties and
the projects. More specifically, these unobserved factors will likely be of two
types: country-specific (political and institutional, like the degree of politi-
cal capture of specific regulatory institutions, the ”tradition” to expropriate
23Additionally, some robustness checks use as dependent variable the dummy variable
indicating whether there is a renegotiation initiated by the government or by both parties.
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investments in certain sectors, or the political culture leading to different de-
grees of popular interference with state-operators interactions) and operator-
specific (like the strategic skills of the firm in renegotiating contract clauses,
or the propensity to incur in strategic underbidding and renegotiate later
on).
To address this, we develop for each contract clause a set of two instru-
ments that are correlated with the variables to be instrumented (regulation,
structure of financing, guarantees, etc.), while not being correlated with the
unobserved factors mentioned above (corruption, operators’ strategic behav-
ior, etc.).24
The intuition can be readily explained taking the case of the price cap
dummy (PC). For each observation, i.e. a given project in country n, sector
s, we compute the average prevalence, at the time the contract is signed,
of price cap regulation for projects in the same sector in different countries
(we denote this variable by PC_S_ins), and in different sectors in different
countries (denoted by PC_NS_ins). For example, to instrument the choice
of price regulation in a water project in Brazil in 1997, we will use the average
prevalence of price cap regulation in water in all other countries at that time,
as well as the average prevalence of price cap regulation in transport in all
other countries at that time.
The relevance of these two variables comes from the fact that, with the
correlation between the choice of price cap regulation and unobserved vari-
ables likely being composed of country- and operator-specific effects, the
choice of price cap regulation will only be correlated across different countries
(and different sectors) through some additional aspects that are independent
of these specific effects. Obvious examples would be the existence of a global
sectorial technological trend implying common shifts in specific contractual
choices, common efficiency reasons (e.g. capital intensity) favoring certain
clauses across countries, or the existence of a worldwide trend or mode ef-
fect in favor of a certain type of policy (e.g. in the case of price regulation
or minimum income guarantees), that may be common across countries for
example because of recommendations from international institutions such as
the Worldbank or other donors.
Furthermore, the rationale for introducing the _NS_ins variables is that
24We are indebted to Fiona Scott-Morton for suggesting this to us. Examples are Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), where product characteristics and prices are instrumented
using characteristics and prices of other substitute products, and Holtz-Eakin (1994), who
instruments US state level public capital by using other states’ levels of public capital.
18
when looking at the same sector across countries, there still exists the risk
that some operators be present in several countries, thus reintroducing some
correlation through firm-specific effects. Note however that while this risk
may be significant for water projects, given that a few firms tend to operate
in many countries worldwide, it is much less so for transport projects where
local consortia are often in charge of concessions.
Summarizing, the choice of contractual variables will be determined by
country level characteristics (see below), a common error term across coun-
tries, capturing a general trend and other non-country-specific effects, and
an error term including country- and operator-specific aspects. Using the
instruments defined above, we are thus able to control for the self-selection
effect in contract determination.
Given this set of instruments, we test the potential endogeneity of all the
contractual variables applying the simple Rivers-Vuong (1988) test.25 The
first stage estimations, shown in Table A3 in the Appendix, include, on top of
the instruments developed above, a measure of the country per capita GDP, a
sector dummy, corruption, bureaucracy quality, rule of law, and the existence
of regulatory body, all of which are exogenous in the sense that they are not
determined by the risk of potential renegotiations, although they may not be
excludable. Their inclusion makes first stage estimations more accurate. For
example, in the case of price cap, Laffont (2005) develops a model showing
that the choice of the type of price regulation can be explained by this set of
variables, which he then successfully tests with cross-country data. We expect
other contractual dimensions to be similarly determined by a combination of
a country’s level of development and institutional characteristics.
The results of the test, which standard errors are bootstrapped to ac-
count of the potential correlation of errors over time, show that exogeneity is
rejected for the price cap (at 1%), investment requirements (at 1%), private
financing (at 1%), minimum income guarantee (at 10%) and bidding process
(at 1%) variables.
Having determined which contractual variables are to be instrumented,
we make use of a two-stage procedure to address the potential endogeneity of
contract clauses.26 Although such an estimation is in principle biased when
the endogenous variable is binary (see Wooldridge, 2002), support for it can
25Note that this test is valid even when the endogenous variable is binary (Wooldridge,
2002).
26Second stage standard errors are adjusted using a bootstrapping procedure.
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be found in Angrist (1991), who states based on a Monte Carlo study that
the bias is negligible and the performance of IV estimates is comparable to
that of estimates computed using the correct likelihood function.
Angrist (2002) further justifies the use of a simple two-stage IV estimation
as long as the focus is on causal effects rather than structural parameters.
One related caveat will thus be that marginal effects should be taken with
some caution when IV estimates are performed.
Therefore, to reinforce confidence in our estimates, we compare them
with the results from a linear probability model (LPM) estimated by two-
stage least squares. Linear probability model have been used in similar ap-
plications with endogenous binary variables.27 Here, we specifically apply a
procedure described in Wooldridge28, which consists in estimating a linear
second stage by IV using the fitted value from the first stage probit as in-
struments. Wooldridge (2002) shows that the 2SLS standard errors and test
statistics are asymptotically valid and that the IV estimator from such an
estimation is asymptotically efficient. Moreover, the procedure is robust to
alternative specifications of the first stage probit. The results (marginal ef-
fects and significance) from 2SLS are very much in line with the other results,
giving confidence in our estimation strategy.
Going now to the results, note that there are good intuitive reasons for the
results of the exogeneity test. Indeed, we would expect contractual aspects
that are routinely predetermined to be exogenous as they are unlikely to
be altered by subsequent strategic interactions between the government and
potential concessionaires. This is obviously the case of the award criteria
and of the inclusion of an arbitration process, which generally depends on
the existing legal framework.
On the other hand, it is sometimes the case that concessions are granted
on the basis of materials that focus on technical criteria and requirements but
are drafted in the absence of sector laws and regulatory expertise and only
weakly delineate what future regulation and tariff adjustment rules would be
(Guasch, 2004). The use of a bidding procedure rather than a direct negotia-
tion with potential operators also unsurprisingly depends on the characteris-
tics of both projects and candidate concessionaires, as shown for example by
Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) in the context of private sector building
contracts. Similarly, as argued in GLS, the exact structure of investments
27See for Example Carrasco (2001).
28Chapter 18, pages 621-25.
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and financing, as well as the inclusion of guarantee clauses, are likely to result
from strategic considerations concerning the attractiveness of a concession to
private operators and the degree of risk involved.
Before going to the results, we discuss briefly the first stage estimations
for the variables deemed endogenous. Note that for each of these, at least one
of our _S_ins and _NS_ins instrumental variables is significant, which is
an indication of the relevance of our instrumental strategy.
The choice of regulation appears to hinge mostly on the quality of in-
stitutions. Price cap regulation is less likely when the bureaucracy is more
efficient, capturing perhaps the enhanced ability of bureaucrats to manage
informationally demanding schemes like rate of return regulation (this is fur-
ther supported by the negative sign of the existence of a regulator variable).
On the other hand, more generic measures like corruption and rule of law
appear to have the opposite effect. One possibility is that price caps are less
attractive for government in environments characterized by higher risk of
bribery and weak enforcement. However, overall the bureaucratic efficiency
effect seems to dominate.
Investment requirements appear more frequent when corruption is lower,
and in the transport sector, where greenfield projects are more likely. As for
exclusive private financing, it dominates in the transport sector (where the
size of the required investments is also likely to be higher, exceeding public
finance capacity). The existence of a regulator ex ante also increases the
probability of some government participation in financing, maybe because
it represents the implicit guarantee of better administrative control over the
project. A better bureaucracy makes private financing more likely, probably
capturing the fact that better bureaucrats find it easier to convince private
investors of the convenience to invest. As for corruption, it has the opposite
effect, which can be related to the effect commonly observed in FDI studies,
showing that private investors prefer direct involvement in situations of weak
governance for risk sharing purposes (Straub, 2005).
Bidding is more frequently used for water concessions, a finding in accor-
dance with results from Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) for example,
to the extent that transport projects are more complex and involve more ex
ante uncertainty, in particular in terms of demand forecasts. The effect of
institutional variables indicates that bidding is more attractive if the envi-
ronment is less corrupt, while a better trained bureaucracy makes the direct
negotiation option more relevant.
Finally, minimum income guarantee clauses are especially prevalent in
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transport projects, again probably due to the high uncertainty surrounding
future demand and as a way to make them attractive to private investors
(see Engel et al. 2003 and INCO, 2004). Such clauses also appear to be more
likely when a regulator is present.
4.5 Results
Tables 3 shows the basic specifications. Table 4 presents instrumental vari-
able estimations (in panels (A) and (B)), where we make use of the two-stage
procedure to address the potential endogeneity of contract clauses. Panel (C)
includes 2SLS as robustness checks.29 Table 5 introduces additional robust-
ness checks, including variables and interactions related to institutional and
political aspects.
(Table 3 here)
Note finally that in all specifications, we avoid introducing the price cap
and the private financing variables together for concerns of multicollinearity.
Indeed, as argued in Laffont (1996), there is a potential link between the
ownership structure, which determines to what the current political majority
is able to capture the rents resulting from the existing incentive scheme, and
the type of price regulation that would prevail.30 Therefore, when private
financing is added to our specifications, in column 2 of Table 3 and in column
4 of Table 4, we exclude the price cap variable.31
We present the main results for the determinants of government-led rene-
gotiation below, making special mention of how they relate to similar esti-
mations in GLS. We discuss first the core variables.
- The existence of a regulatory body is again negative and significant most
of the time. Its economic impact, however, appears to be smaller (about
half) of what it is for firm-led renegotiations. Also, we again observe that
it somewhat loses statistical significance when instrumental estimations are
performed, which we interpret as being linked to the fact that this variable
is used in the first stage estimation and that it is effective through better
contract clauses.
29As can be seen from the table and the discussion of marginal effects below, 2SLS very
much support the results from the probit analysis.
30We thank a referee for signaling this to us.
31Indeed, when both variables are included together, we observe that the price cap
variable loses significance.
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- The price cap variable, which is one of the most important result in the
context of firm-led renegotiations, does again take a positive sign in Table 4.
When instrumented in Table 5, it is positive and strongly significant. Thus,
the risk effect of price cap regulation (renegotiation to relax an excessively
stringent cap) appears to dominate a potential rent-shifting motive (govern-
ment renegotiation to limit excessive rents due to a loose cap), with marginal
effects of 12 to 15% in both the probit and the LPM.
- Duration since award is positive and very significant.
- The existence of investment requirements does not yield consistent re-
sults in Table 3, being generally not significant. However, when instrumented,
the investment variable changes sign and becomes negative and significant.
Its marginal effect is between 3 and 6%.
- The quality of bureaucracy is still negative and significant throughout.
However, the corruption variable, whether introduced alone or together with
the quality of bureaucracy index, is positive and significant in Table 3, mean-
ing that a less corrupt environment is conducive to more renegotiation. This
is consistent with our theoretical framework that implies a reverse effect for
that variable. Intuitively, the quality of the bureaucracy dimension may be
related to a contract-improving effect similar to the one linked to the ex-
istence of a regulator, while corruption would capture the standard effect
through the π(x) function.
- The lagged election variable is still positive, implying more renegotia-
tions after national elections. Its significance varies between 2 and 5% de-
pending on what other variables are included in the specification. Note that
substituting this variable with a dummy indicating effective political changes
following elections yields very similar results.32
- The economic cycle has again an impact on the probability of renegotia-
tions, with lagged growth shocks implying more renegotiations. They appear
however to matter slightly less (this makes sense if a significant fraction of
renegotiations are rather linked to the political cycle) and in a different way
than for firm-led renegotiations: The marginal effect is lower (around +0.5
and +0.2% after one and two years respectively for each one-point decrease in
32This variable is defined by imputing as changes cases in which there was a shift in the
dominant party majority in Congress, or a new president coming from a different party
than his or her predecessor. Given that the scope of many concessions (especially in water)
is limited to local or regional political districts, we would need to construct similar reliable
variables (elections and effective changes of majority) at the level of the relevant local
elections to be able to test the effect of political turnover more precisely.
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the growth rate), and the effect is stronger with a one year lag and decreases
after that. A similar pattern is observed for exchange rate shocks.33
Additional variables introduced in Table 3 include:
- Exclusive private financing has a reducing effect on the probability of
renegotiations, and appears to be strongly significant both in Table 3 and
when instrumented in Table 4. Its marginal effect is between 12% (probit)
and 14% (LPM).
- The existence of an arbitration process, which we had previously related
to the cost of renegotiation, is here negative and significant (Table 3, column
3). Exogeneity is accepted for this variable.
- Minimum income guarantee is consistently positive and strongly signif-
icant, and this carries over when it is instrumented (Table 4). Its marginal
effect is between 4% (LPM) and 5% (probit), which indicates the inappro-
priateness of such clauses. In the case of Colombia’s road program, the
cumulated amount of guarantees due by the State to concessionaires as of
2004 amounts approximately to the equivalent of US$100 million, threaten-
ing to weight heavily on future fiscal results. For this reason, least present
value of revenue auctions have been introduced for new concessions awards,
as a way to substitute for this type of guarantees (INCO, 2004).
- The existence of a bidding process previous to the award of the conces-
sion is positive and significant (Table 3, column 4). This effect remains when
performing IV estimates. As discussed in GLS, the existence of a bidding
procedure may generate several conflicting effects (strategic underbidding,
selection of more efficient firms, reduction of their potential profits), and the
way these interact to produce the net positive effect we observe is difficult to
analyze. The marginal effect is between 10% (LPM) and 12% (probit).
- A dummy variable classifying award criteria (1 for highest price, highest
canon or lowest subsidy, hence monetary transfer considerations not prone
to subsequent interpretational subjectivity, 0 for others), shows up negative
and significant (table 4, column 7). Note that exogeneity is accepted for that
variable. Therefore, less manipulable criteria seem to have some reducing
impact on the possibility of subsequent renegotiations.34
(Table 4 here)
33Results are not shown here to save space.
34These results call for further inquiry, but are left for future research. See Engel, Fischer
and Galetovic (2001 and 2003) for a discussion of award criteria, including their proposal
of a least present value of revenue auction.
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The next section digs further into the institutional and regulatory envi-
ronment of successful concessions.
4.6 Institutional and Political Aspects
Table 5 introduces additional robustness checks, including some interactions
meant to explore further the impact of institutional and political aspects.
In column 1, we interact the dummy variable for the existence of a reg-
ulator with the corruption index. The interaction is positive and significant
at the 1% level, while the dummy for the existence of a regulator remains
negative and significant. Considering that a higher value of the corruption
index corresponds to a less corrupt environment, this can be interpreted by
saying that the stronger corruption, the more important the effect of having
a regulator in place to limit the incidence of renegotiations. This results in-
dicates that the impact of a regulatory body is especially important in weak
governance environments.
(Table 5 here)
To explore whether the effect of political cycles is affected by the general
perceived quality of institutions, in column 2 we interact the election variable
with the corruption index, which yields a negative and significant sign, and
in column 3 we obtain a similar negative and significant result by interacting
the quality of the bureaucracy index with the election variable. This shows
that the better the bureaucracy, the milder the post-election effect.
Overall these results give additional evidence of the fact that strong reg-
ulatory mechanisms are specially important when the institutional quality
is low. In this context, experienced and independent regulators are likely to
act as barriers against political opportunism.35 Note also that Guasch (2004)
presents results that confirm our findings, based on an extended sample cov-
ering almost 900 concessions in 15 countries.36
In our model, government-led renegotiations are both Pareto improving
and rent shifting ones. Empirically, our sample contains a small number
of renegotiations that are considered to be the result of a joint call. As
35See Cubbin and Stern (2005) and Wallsten (2001), for cross-country evidence that
improved regulatory independence and quality have a positive impact on performance and
efficiency in the electricity and telecommunication sectors respectively.
36This sample include energy and telecommunications projects.
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discussed in GLS, this may both reflect the fact that the renegotiation was
desired by both parties or that there was not a clear case to attribute the
call, as with some Mexican road projects. In any case, it can be argued that
joint calls are close in nature to Pareto improving government calls, so Table 5
presents robustness checks using as a dependent variable the dummy variable
indicating whether there is a renegotiation initiated by the government or by
both parties. Overall, the main results are unchanged.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Using a sample of 307 Latin American transport and water concessions in
the 1990s, we have tested the determinants of government-led renegotiations
and implemented an original instrumental variable approach to deal with
potential contractual endogeneity.
Overall, the analysis of government-led renegotiations confirms some of
the main insight that Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) presented with re-
spect to firm-led renegotiation. Concessions’ fragility is due to a mix of flaws
in contract design, inadequate regulatory frameworks and deficient institu-
tional environments, and the impact of macroeconomic shocks. Key results
are again the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding con-
cessions and the sensitivity of price cap regulated concessions to shocks.
There are, however, important differences with firm-led renegotiations.
Most importantly, the financing variables (those affecting the status quo
payoffs of the renegotiating parties, as private financing and investment re-
quirements) and the corruption variable tend to come out with reversed signs,
which is what we should expect from the way they affect the firm and the
government in the bargaining process.
Table 6 summarizes the results by showing the sign of the main determi-
nants found to have an effect on both types of renegotiations. In particular,
it highlights (shaded rows) that the sign of the investment, private financ-
ing and corruption variables are indeed reversed, which provides supports
for the theoretical model presented in the first part of this paper.37 On the
other hand, other unchanged results include the effect of elections, economic
37Since the estimations in GLS were based on a different set of instruments, Table 7
relies on results obtained when running estimations of firm-led renegotiations determinants
with the same set of instruments used in the present paper.
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shocks, duration since award, as well as the inadequacy of minimum income
guarantee clauses.
Table 6: Comparative summary of the results 
 Government-led 
renegotiation 
Firm-led renegotiation 
Existence of a regulator Negative Negative 
Price cap regulation Positive Positive 
Duration Positive Positive 
Investment requirements Negative Positive 
Private financing Negative Positive 
Quality of bureaucracy Negative Negative 
Corruption Positive Negative 
Elections Positive Positive 
Growth Negative Negative 
Minimum income guarantee Positive Positive 
 
Additional policy insights come from better and more precise evidence of
the link between the regulatory framework and the institutional and political
environment. Indeed, it appears that having efficient and independent regu-
latory authorities in place when awarding concessions is especially important
because it helps limit the damaging effects of corruption, weakness in the
rule of law and the bureaucratic framework, as well as the potential strategic
behavior of the government following changes in power.
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7 Appendix
Table A1: List of variables, source and summary statistics 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCESSIONS   
Dummy variables, 1=Yes, 0=No Yes No 
Renegotiation: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not a 
renegotiation of the concession contract. 
162 (52.8%) 145 (47.2%) 
Renegotiation initiated by the firm 53 254 
Renegotiation initiated by the government 94 213 
Renegotiation initiated by both 15 292 
Existence of regulatory body: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not 
a regulatory body at the time of the concession first coming into operation. 
180 (58.6%) 127 (41.4%) 
Regulatory body is part of the government ministry: Dummy variable indicating 
whether the regulatory body is constituted as a part of the government ministry or 
not. 
293 (95.7%) 13 (4.3%) 
Price cap: Dummy variable indicating whether the tariff regulation imposed by the 
regulator is a price cap. 
283 (92.2%) 24 (7.8%) 
Investment requirements: Dummy variable indicating whether there are or not 
investment requirements as part of the concession contract. 
235 (76.5%) 72 (23.5%) 
Private financing: Dummy variable indicating whether the project is funded 
entirely through private funds (without any financial investment of the state, 
whether local or national) or not. 
160 (61.1%) 102 (38.9%) 
Bidding process: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not a bidding 
process to award the concession. 
272 (88.6%) 35 (11.4%) 
Award criteria: Dummy variable classifying award criteria (1 for highest price, 
highest canon or lowest subsidy, 0 for all others) 
106 (34.5%) 201 (65.5%) 
Minimum income guarantee: Dummy variable indicating whether there is or not a 
government guarantee in terms of minimum income promissory. 
63 (20.5%) 244 (79.5%) 
Arbitration process: Dummy variable indicating whether there is or not a formal 
set of arbitration processes stated in the contract providing for the settlement of a 
dispute between the concession holder and the government, should such a situation 
arise. 
179 (58.3%) 128 (41.7%) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT   
Dummy variables, 1=Yes, 0=No   
Election: Dummy variable indicating whether there were or not national elections 
(legislative or presidential) in any given year. Source: Political Database of the 
Americas. Georgetown University/Organization of American States. Center for 
Latin American Studies. 
 
n.r. 
 
n.r. 
Political Change: Dummy variable indicating whether there were or not a change 
in power following national elections (legislative or presidential) in any given 
year. Source: Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown 
University/Organization of American States. Center for Latin American Studies. 
 
n.r. 
 
n.r. 
Continuous variables Mean S.D. 
Duration since award: Indicates the number of years a concession has been in 
operation since its award. 
n.r. n.r. 
Corruption: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide; 
annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range from 1 to 6. 
Higher value means less corruption. 
2.94 0.69 
Rule of law: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide; 
annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range from 1 to 6. 
Higher value means better rule of law. 
2.92 0.99 
Bureaucratic quality: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country 
Risk Guide; annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range 
from 1 to 6. Higher value means better bureaucratic quality. 
3.36 0.61 
GDP per capita   
Growth: Yearly growth rate of GDP in real terms. Source: World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank. 
n.r. n.r. 
Exchange rate: Annual evolution of the real exchange rate (calculated as (index 
rate of year t – index rate of year t-1)/index rate of year t). A positive value 
indicates depreciation. Source: Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
n.r. 
 
n.r. 
Note: For variables varying over time, like the election dummy, duration since award, and 
macroeconomic variables, the summary statistics are omitted (denoted by n.r.: non relevant). 
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Table A2: Incidence of renegotiations according to characteristics 
RENEGOTIATION Yes (162) No (145) 
Characteristics of Concessions Yes No Yes No 
Existence of regulatory body 44.4% 55.6% 74.5% 25.5%
Regulatory body is part of the government ministry 100 % 0 % 91.0% 9.0%
Price cap 95.1% 4.9% 89.0% 11.0%
Investment requirements 75.9% 24.1% 77.2% 22.8%
Private financing 48.5% 51.5% 74.6% 25.4%
Bidding process 89.5% 10.5% 87.6% 12.4%
Award criteria 17.9% 82.1% 53.1% 46.9%
Minimum income guarantee 29.0% 71.0% 11.0% 89.0%
Arbitration process 42.6% 57.4% 75.9% 24.1%
   
RENEGOTIATION INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT Yes (94) No (213) 
Characteristics of Concessions Yes No Yes No 
Existence of regulatory body 37.2% 62.8% 68.1% 31.9%
Regulatory body is part of the government ministry 100 % 0 % 93.9% 6.1%
Price cap 97.9% 2.1% 89.7% 10.3%
Investment requirements 61.7% 38.3% 83.1% 16.9%
Private financing 20.3% 79.7% 75.6% 24.4%
Bidding process 97.9% 2.1% 84.5% 15.5%
Award criteria 1.1% 98.9% 49.3% 50.7%
Minimum income guarantee 22.3% 77.7% 19.7% 80.3%
Arbitration process 18.1% 81.9% 76.1% 23.9%
Note: 306 Observations for Regulatory body is part of the government ministry, 262 Observations for 
private financing. 
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Table A3: First stage estimations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Price cap 
(PC) 
Investment 
requirements 
(IR) 
Private 
financing 
(PF) 
Award 
criteria (AC) 
Arbitration 
process (AP) 
Min. income 
guarantee 
(MI) 
Bidding 
process (BP) 
Constant 50.574 6.218 2.366 -3.399 14.376 14.723 4.765 
 (32.985) (1.209)*** (1.415)* (1.211)*** (6.762)** (3.502)*** (3.719) 
Per capita GDP 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Existence of  -3.823 0.018 -1.584 -0.480 -1.219 -2.215 0.940 
regulatory body (1.585)** (0.354) (0.477)*** (0.313) (0.668)* (1.639) (0.351)*** 
Corruption  1.192 0.332 -0.240 0.142 3.978 -0.095 0.844 
 (0.450)*** (0.186)* (0.200) (0.185) (1.223)*** (0.185) (0.186)*** 
Bureaucratic  -3.084 -0.297 0.476 -0.095 1.904 0.008 -1.541 
quality (0.767)*** (0.192) (0.251)* (0.180) (0.467)*** (0.256) (0.270)*** 
Rule of law 0.237 -0.099 0.140 -0.635 -1.700 0.677 0.952 
 (0.496) (0.175) (0.244) (0.185)*** (0.665)** (0.616) (0.241)*** 
Water sector -1.669 -2.505 -2.083 -3.258 -38.847 -4.481 2.006 
dummy (1.293) (0.402)*** (0.402)*** (0.549)*** (11.032)*** (1.548)*** (0.554)*** 
PC_S_ins -63.268       
 (26.357)**       
PC_NS_ins 22.522       
 (12.024)*       
IR_S_ins  -3.506      
  (0.589)***      
IR_NS_ins  -0.563      
  (0.313)*      
PF_S_ins   -0.265     
   (0.459)     
PF_NS_ins   -1.402     
   (0.512)***     
AC_S_ins    -0.049    
    (0.395)    
AC_NS_ins    0.100    
    (0.292)    
AP_S_ins     -35.900   
     (11.017)***   
AP_NS_ins     -1.649   
     (0.779)**   
MI_S_ins      -3.865  
      (1.817)**  
MI_NS_ins      0.115  
      (0.418)  
BP_S_ins       -7.045 
       (1.226)*** 
BP_NS_ins       2.069 
       (2.368) 
Observations 307 307 262 307 296 305 307 
Probit estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Specific instruments (_ins) are averages of same variable (denoted by the variable abbreviation, e.g. PC: price cap, IR: Investment 
requirements, etc.) in different countries,  for the same sector (_S) and other sector (_NS).
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Table 3: Random effect probit panel 
Basic estimations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Dependent variable 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Existence of  -0.099 -1.038*** -0.220 -0.081 1.054*** -0.140 -0.316 
regulatory body (0.193) (0.291) (0.213) (0.190) (0.295) (0.196) (0.220) 
Price cap 0.786**  0.381 0.193 0.310 0.596* 1.011*** 
 (0.320)  (0.340) (0.367) (0.393) (0.337) (0.315) 
Duration since award 0.157*** 0.312*** 0.145*** 0.197*** 0.260*** 0.135*** 0.127*** 
 (0.038) (0.051) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041) 
Investment  0.028 -0.397** 0.066 0.053 -0.181 0.010 -0.050 
requirements (0.164) (0.199) (0.170) (0.165) (0.176) (0.165) (0.175) 
Bureaucratic quality -0.535*** -0.522*** -0.467*** -0.627*** -0.853*** -0.485*** -0.459*** 
 (0.114) (0.143) (0.126) (0.119) (0.142) (0.117) (0.126) 
Election-1 0.484*** 0.215 0.648*** 0.476*** 0.487*** 0.531*** 0.548*** 
 (0.125) (0.163) (0.137) (0.127) (0.133) (0.128) (0.132) 
GDP growth -1 -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.095*** -0.080*** -0.112*** -0.074*** -0.085*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
GDP growth -2 -0.026 -0.056* -0.030 -0.025 -0.025 -0.031 -0.048* 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) 
Transport sector  -0.961*** -0.217 -0.259 -0.932*** -1.860*** -1.111*** -0.403 
Dummy (0.215) (0.303) (0.266) (0.213) (0.297) (0.229) (0.247) 
Private financing  -1.252***      
  (0.206)      
Arbitration process   -1.035***     
   (0.209)     
Bidding process    1.148***    
    (0.341)    
Corruption      0.954***   
     (0.170)   
Minimum income       0.421**  
guarantee      (0.185)  
Award criteria       -1.742*** 
       (0.418) 
Number of obs. 1267 1132 1226 1267 1267 1262 1267 
Log Likelihood -263.16 -173.83 -247.31 -255.67 -241.05 -260.53 -243.44 
   Marginal effects (dy/dx)a    
Existence of 
regulatory body 
-0.008 -0.043 -0.013 -0.005 0.036 -0.010 -0.012 
Price cap 0.034  0.016 0.011 0.010 0.027 0.016 
Duration since award 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.004 
Investment 
requirements 
0.002 -0.013 0.004 0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 
Bureaucratic quality -0.040 -0.0128 -0.026 -0.040 -0.035 -0.034 -0.016 
Election-1 0.043 0.006 0.048 0.036 0.025 0.046 0.024 
GDP growth -1 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
GDP growth -2 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
Transport sector 
dummy 
-0.115 -0.006 -0.017 -0.096 -0.228 -0.137 -0.018 
Private financing  -0.057      
Arbitration process   -0.084     
Bidding process    0.039    
Corruption     0.039   
Minimum income 
guarantee 
     0.037  
Award criteria       -0.055 
Constant term omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level. 
(a) For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it corresponds to an increase by 1 unit.
34
Table 4: Instrumental variable estimations 
(A)  Random effect probit   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Gov-Reneg  Gov-Reneg  Gov-Reneg  Gov-Reneg  Gov-Reneg  Gov-Reneg  
Existence of  0.035 -0.059 0.119 -0.735*** -0.046 -0.132 
regulatory body (0.262) (0.203) (0.360) (0.274) (0.256) (0.212) 
Price cap  0.861**   -0.600 0.745** 
  (1.742)   (2.755) (2.006) 
Price cap (IV) 2.187***  2.594***    
 (1.390)  (2.033)    
Duration since award 0.202*** 0.179*** 0.255*** 0.143*** 0.257*** 0.126*** 
 (0.066) (0.044) (0.084) (0.047) (0.076) (0.045) 
Investment  -0.030   0.233 -0.087 0.004 
requirements (0.219)   (0.195) (0.194) (0.158) 
Investment   -0.498*** -0.702***    
Requirements (IV)  (0.223) (0.270)    
Bureaucratic quality -0.627*** -0.615*** -0.752*** -0.537*** -0.799*** -0.487*** 
 (0.231) (0.148) (0.259) (0.180) (0.250) (0.142) 
Private financing (IV)    -2.068***   
    (0.487)   
Bidding process (IV)     2.836***  
     (4.513)  
Minimum income       0.733*** 
guarantee (IV)      (0.265) 
Election-1 0.507*** 0.481*** 0.522*** 0.541*** 0.474*** 0.559*** 
 (0.130) (0.134) (0.141) (0.133) (0.135) (0.119) 
GDP growth -1 -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.095*** -0.086*** -0.096*** -0.082*** 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.038) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) 
GDP growth -2 -0.027 -0.026 -0.032 -0.024 -0.028 -0.040 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.046) (0.043) (0.047) (0.039) 
Transport sector  -1.017*** -0.773*** -0.864*** 0.058 -0.860*** -1.217*** 
Dummy (0.260) (0.249) (0.376) (0.330) (0.281) (0.237) 
Number of obs. 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267 
Log Likelihood -254.71 -261.09 -251.36 -256.37 -248.34 -259.53 
(B)  Marginal effects (dy/dx)   
Exist of regul body 0.002 -0.004 0.005 -0.056 -0.002 -0.009 
Price cap 0.136 0.032 0.122  -0.044 0.029 
Duration since award 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.008 
Invt requirements -0.002 -0.034 -0.033 0.012 -0.004 0.0003 
Bureaucratic quality -0.039 -0.041 -0.035 -0.031 -0.035 -0.033 
Private financing    -0.120   
Bidding process     0.124  
Min income guarantee      0.049 
Election-1 0.039 0.039 0.031 0.039 0.025 0.046 
GDP growth -1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
GDP growth -2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
Transport dummy -0.109 -0.078 -0.067 0.003 -0.063 -0.152 
(C)   2SLS    
Exist of regul body -0.014 (0.020) -0.030 (0.020) -0.018 (0.021) -0.075*** (0.022) -0.021 (0.020) -0.029 (0.020) 
Price cap 0.148*** (0.040) 0.046* (0.025) 0.141*** (0.041)  -0.014 (0.032) 0.039 (0.027) 
Duration since award 0.014*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004) 0.013*** (0.004) 
Invt requirements 0.013 (0.022) -0.056 (0.037) -0.060 (0.038) -0.009 (0.021) 0.005 (0.022) 0.001 (0.022) 
Bureaucratic quality -0.052*** (0.011) -0.054*** (0.011) -0.056*** (0.011) -0.016 (0.012) -0.058*** (0.011) -0.044*** (0.012) 
Private financing    -0.138*** (0.048)   
Bidding process     0.105*** (0.032)  
Min income guarantee      0.040 (0.029) 
Election-1 0.058*** (0.015) 0.056*** (0.015) 0.056*** (0.015) 0.012 (0.014) 0.056*** (0.015) 0.059*** (0.015) 
GDP growth -1 -0.006*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) 
GDP growth -2 -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
Transport dummy -0.136*** (0.025) -0.097*** (0.030) -0.098***  0.031) -0.061* (0.037) -0.120*** (0.025) -0.140*** (0.026) 
Constant term omitted. Significance level: 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).  
Panel (A): Standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped estimates based on 100 replications. The significance level (1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)) is assessed using the percentile confidence interval. For example, for the 95% interval, the bottom 
endpoint is the 2.5th percentile and the upper endpoint is the 97.5th percentile. If the confidence interval build in that way 
contains 0, the coefficient is deemed not significant. Non-normality of the distribution may explain that coefficients are found 
significant while having relatively large standard errors. 
Panel (B): Values reported are marginal effects of second stage probit estimations. For dummy variables, dy/dx is for 
discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it corresponds to an increase by 1 unit. 
Panel (C): 2SLS Linear probability model estimated using fitted values from the first stage probit as instruments (see 
Wooldridge (2002) pages 621-25. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 5: Random effect probit panel 
Additional results and robustness checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent variable 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt or both 
Reneg. 
Initiated by 
Govt or both 
Existence of  -6.227*** 1.108*** -0.144 0.034 0.194 
regulatory body (1.334) (0.302) (0.202) (0.181) (0.218) 
Price cap -0.013 0.300 0.710** 0.571**  
 (0.410) (0.397) (0.316) (0.252)  
Price cap (IV)     1.891** 
     (0.721) 
Duration since award 0.282*** 0.276*** 0.154*** 0.136*** 0.181*** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.038) (0.034) (0.049) 
Investment  -0.330* -0.200 0.092 0.068  
requirements (0.187) (0.177) (0.170) (0.159)  
Investment      -0.515** 
Requirements (IV)     (0.237) 
Bureaucratic quality -1.017*** -0.912*** -0.324** -0.519*** -0.666*** 
 (0.155) (0.148) (0.133) (0.102) (0.154) 
Corruption  -0.956*** 1.443***    
 (0.355) (0.292)    
Regulator * Corruption 2.281***     
 (0.441)     
Election-1 * Corruption  -0.714**    
  (0.289)    
Election-1 * Bur. quality   -0.645***   
   (0.247)   
Election-1 0.556*** 2.595*** 2.590*** 0.515*** 0.511*** 
 (0.138) (0.870) (0.808) (0.114) (0.135) 
GDP growth -1 -0.156*** -0.126*** -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.057** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.027) 
GDP growth -2 -0.071** -0.032 -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.036) 
Transport sector  -1.340*** -1.922*** -0.952*** -0.859*** -0.651*** 
Dummy (0.303) (0.305) (0.224) (0.202) (0.240) 
Number of obs. 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267 
Log Likelihood -227.38 -237.37 -259.26 -309.80 -298.77 
  Marginal effects (dy/dx)a   
Existence of regulatory 
body 
-0.955 0.028 -0.011 0.004 0.017 
Price cap -0.000 0.007 0.032 0.042 0.174 
Duration since award 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.017 
Investment requirements -0.010 -0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.047 
Bureaucratic quality -0.024 -0.028 -0.024 -0.055 -0.061 
Corruption  -0.023 0.044    
Regulator * Corruption 0.054     
Election-1 * Corruption  -0.022    
Election-1 * Bur. quality   -0.047   
Election-1 0.018 0.309 0.468 0.064 0.056 
GDP growth -1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
GDP growth -2 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
Transport sector Dummy -0.084 -0.205 -.113 -0.131 -0.080 
Constant term omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis Standard errors in column 5 are bootstrapped 
estimates based on 100 replications. The significance level (1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)) is 
assessed using the percentile confidence interval. For example, for the 95% interval, the bottom 
endpoint is the 2.5th percentile and the upper endpoint is the 97.5th percentile. If the confidence interval 
build in that way contains 0, the coefficient is deemed not significant. Non-normality of the 
distribution may explain that coefficients are found significant while having relatively large standard 
errors. 
(a) For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it 
corresponds to an increase by 1 unit. 36
